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Abstract.  We use a simple model of ecosystem management to demonstrate that apparently 
rational management approaches can lead to ecological collapse.   Our model of the ecosystem 
management of lake eutrophication integrates lake dynamics, management decision-making, and 
learning in a framework that is deliberately simplified to highlight the role of model uncertainty.  
The simulated lake can switch between alternate eutrophic and oligotrophic states.  Managers 
consider two management models of the lake, one for an oligotrophic lake and the other for a 
eutrophic lake.  As managers observe the lake varying from year to year, they  estimate how well 
each of the two management models is supported by the observed data.  Management policies 
maximize the expected net present value of the lake. Even under optimistic assumptions about 
environmental variation, learning ability, and management control, conventional decision theory 
and optimal control approaches fail to stabilize ecological dynamics.  Rather, these methods 
drive ecosystems into cycles of collapse and recovery.  We suggest how scientists could help 
prevent ecosystem management from driving ecosystems towards collapse. 
 
 
  Ecosystem management has a long and diverse history.  It has sometimes been successful 
(Berkes and Folke 1998), and sometimes not.   For example, historical societies, such as the 
Maya (Hodell et al. 2001), and modern scientifically managed resource extraction systems, such 
as the Northern cod (Walters and Maguire 1996), have appeared to succeed at ecosystem 
management until an abrupt and surprising collapse.  Researchers have tried to explain these 
collapses.  Some researchers attribute ecological collapse to ignorance of gradual ecological 
change (Martin 1973, Alroy 2001), rational overexploitation (Clark 1973), or the difficulties of 
creating effective institutions to manage common pool resources (Hardin 1968).  Others focus on 
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the role of social inequality and greed (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987).  Although few people 
would argue that resource collapses derive from single causes, we believe that downplaying the 
uncertainty of management models may be a neglected cause of ecological collapse.    
A large portion of ecological management involves decision making under conditions of 
uncertainty.  Current approaches to ecosystem management often cope with uncertainty by 
fitting models to data, or using data to compare competing models (Hilborn and Mangel 1997, 
Clark et al. 2001).  In some ecological conflicts, the management of salmon in the Columbia 
River for example, ecological management has focused on expensive and sophisticated attempts 
to assess the credibility of a wide variety of alternate models of ecosystem functioning 
(Marmorek and Peters 2001).  The aim is to discover which model or set of models appears to 
best forecast the future behavior of the ecosystem.  Although such efforts are certainly 
worthwhile, there may be pressure for science to act as a dispassionate tool to assess the relative 
validity of a selected set of alternative models.  Too often the consideration of uncertainty 
focuses only upon the prediction errors of a single model while the credibility of the model itself 
is not assessed (Clark et al. 2001).  The credibility of a given model depends on the other models 
with which it is compared and on the data available for comparing models.  If the data represent 
only a subset of the potential behavior of the ecosystem, then the model comparison may be 
biased, or the appropriate model may not even be discovered, because the behaviors of the 
ecosystem relevant to the appropriate model have not been observed.  If an important model is 
omitted from the set of models under consideration, substantial errors can occur in assessing the 
credibility of models, making predictions, and choosing management actions.  Thus, model 
uncertainty has critical implications for ecosystem management, but the assessment of model 
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uncertainty is limited by the range of ecosystem behaviors observed in the data, and by the 
diversity of models created by the analyst.    
In this paper, we show that when the family of models being considered does not 
adequately capture key dynamics, even sophisticated management approaches will function 
poorly.  We model a management process that uses passive adaptive management to select 
policies.  Passive adaptive management is thought to be the best management practice when 
active adaptive management experiments are not possible (Walters 1986).  In this case, passive 
adaptive management chooses policies based on the posterior probabilities of two competing 
models given observed data.  We focus on model misspecification by allowing the managers to 
know, with precision, the model parameters and the state of nature. 
 
RATIONALE 
Case studies and detailed simulation models provide insight into the diversity of 
ecosystem management approaches that have been applied in different situations.  However, the 
complexity of the examples and the multiple interacting sources of variation in each situation 
make it difficult to isolate the role of uncertainty in a clear way.  Therefore, we have created an 
exceptionally simple socio-ecological model of ecosystem management that isolates the role of 
model uncertainty. 
Our model greatly simplifies the dynamics of the ecosystem, the information available to 
managers, and the impact of management interventions, in order to focus attention on model 
uncertainty, its interaction with decision making, and its implications for ecosystem dynamics.  
We use linear equations to describe lake dynamics, providing access to useful analytical 
simplifications. Ecologists have often introduced highly simplified models to isolate the role of 
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particular processes, such as the logistic model to study density dependence.  Although the 
logistic model exposes useful insights about density dependence, one would not use it to predict 
or manage a population with complex age and spatial structure, and subjected to multiple 
limiting factors.  Similarly, our model would not be used to predict ecosystem management in 
situations where ecological dynamics contain multiple feedback loops and are driven by complex 
external events or when ecological policies are determined by the interplay of a diversity of 
interacting institutions.  In our model, dynamics cannot be explained by such ecological or social 
complexities because they are omitted.  Instead, the model allows us to focus specifically on the 
role of model uncertainty in the dynamics of a managed ecosystem.  We will show that the 
dynamics of model choice from a limited set of alternatives lead to cycles of collapse and 
recovery. 
To investigate the dynamics of ecosystem management we use the problem of lake 
eutrophication.  Lakes can exist in either an oligotrophic or eutrophic state (Scheffer et al. 1993, 
Smith 1998).  Oligotrophic lakes are characterized by low nutrient inputs, low to moderate levels 
of plant production, and relatively clear water.  Eutrophic lakes have high nutrient inputs, high 
plant production, and murky water.  They can also be anoxic and produce blooms of toxic algae.  
People usually find that oligotrophic lakes produce ecosystem services, such as water for human 
consumption, irrigation, or industrial use, resources such as fish or waterfowl, or recreation, that 
are more valuable than those produced by eutrophic lakes (Wilson and Carpenter 1999).   
Eutrophication is usually caused by the excessive input of nutrients, primarily phosphorus 
(P) to a lake (Schindler 1977).  Many types of human activities produce nutrients, but 
agricultural fertilizers are a chief source (Carpenter et al. 1998b).  Phosphorus in fertilizer builds 
up in soil that erodes into water bodies and causes eutrophication (Bennett et al. 2001).  
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Agricultural production depends upon the use of fertilizer.  Because fertilizer increases the value 
of agriculture while decreasing the value of ecosystem services, there is a tradeoff between the 
benefits from polluting activities and the costs these activities impose on ecosystem services. 
Phosphorus recycling within a lake can maintain a eutrophic state.  Recycling exhibits threshold 
behavior that is related to the accumulation of P in sediments, wind mixing, and the oxygen 
content of deep water (Carpenter et al. 1998a).  Experimental lake manipulations have shown 
that only a few years of high P levels can lead to the accumulation of enough P in the sediment to 
initiate P recycling (Schindler et al. 1987).  In eutrophic lakes, the amount of P recycled from 
lake sediments may exceed annual inputs (Soranno et al. 1997).  The ease with which a eutrophic 
lake can return to an oligotrophic state following a reduction of nutrient inputs depends upon 
properties of the lake such as area, depth, food web structure, submerged vegetation, and the 
concentration of P in lake sediments.  Some eutrophic lakes quickly return to an oligotrophic 
state following the cessation of nutrient addition, while others do not (Scheffer et al. 1993, 
Carpenter et al. 1998a). 
 
A MINIMAL MODEL 
Our model of ecosystem management consists of a model of lake dynamics, a learning process, 
and a management decision making process (Fig. 1).  Lake P dynamics can produce eutrophic or 
oligotrophic states.  Managers have two competing management models of the lake.  Their 
degree of belief in each of these models determines their expectation of the lake’s response to 
management.  Lake management is based upon maximizing the expected value of a tradeoff 
between lake pollution and lake ecosystem services.  Each year, scientists collect data and update 
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their beliefs about their management models.  The details of the lake, learning, and management 
components of our ecosystem management model are presented below.  
 
[Insert Fig. 1 Near Here] 
 
Lake dynamics 
We represent the state of a lake by the concentration of P.  We assume that the dynamics of P 
within a lake depends upon the loading of P, P removal, and P recycling.  The P dynamics in a 
lake are modeled by the difference equation 
<1>     Xt+1 = B * Xt + b+ lt + St     if    Xt < X crit and 
     Xt+1 = B * Xt + r + b+ lt + St   if    Xt ≥ X crit 
        St ~ N(0,σ
2) 
Where    Xt represents the concentration of P at time t ,   is the baseline natural P loading into the 
lake,   
    b
lt is the additional anthropogenic P loading into the lake at time t , and      r is the amount of P 
recycled and maintained in the lake.    B represents the proportion of P that is retained in the lake 
after one year.     Xcritis the critical P concentration at which P recycling begins.    St is a random 




The proportion of P retained by the lake (   B) must be between 0 and 1.  Both the base ( ) 
and the anthropogenic loading (  
  b
lt) must be equal to or greater than zero.  Furthermore, for 
cultural eutrophication to occur the value of   Xcritmust exceed  .    b
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Over a wide range of parameters and P loadings, lake dynamics can exhibit two alternate 
equilibrium values of    X .  The following equilibrium points ( ) are found by letting    X1
*, X2
*







 if    X1




r + b + l
1− B
 if    X2
* > X crit 
If    X1
* < X crit an oligotrophic equilibrium exists, and if    X2
* > X crit a eutrophic equilibrium also 
exists.  Because the equilibrium value of    X depends upon the P loading, changes in P loading 
can cause equilibrium point to appear or disappear (Fig. 2).  This response to changes in P 
loading can cause surprising changes in lake behavior. 
 
[Insert Fig. 2 Near Here] 
 
Learning: 
Managers have two alternative models of the lake.  Managers have some degree of belief that the 
lake is either oligotrophic <3> or eutrophic <4>, but management is uncertain about which of 
these management models is more accurate. 
<3> Model  1:     Xt+1 = B * Xt + b+ lt + St 
<4> Model  2:     Xt+1 = B * Xt + r + b+ lt + St 
Model 1 corresponds to the belief that P loading drives lake P dynamics.  Model 2 corresponds to 
the belief that P recycling and P loading drive lake P dynamics.  For a given P loading, the 
eutrophic model (Model 2) predicts a higher observed concentration of P in the lake than the 
oligotrophic model.  Each of these models accurately describes lake dynamics under a range of 
conditions (Model 1 is correct when    X < X crit, while Model 2 is correct when    X ≥ X crit).  
However, managers are unaware that recycling is a function of P concentration.   
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To focus our analysis on model uncertainty, we allow managers to know correctly and 
precisely the rate of nutrient retention (   B), natural P load ( ), the amount of P recycling (   b   r), 
and the probability distribution of shocks (   S). This assumption provides the managers with more 
information than they would likely have in reality.  This simplification places all management 
uncertainty on the choice between models <3> and <4>.  Managers attempt to maximize the 
utility of the lake by controlling P loading to the lake.  Using passive adaptive management, the 
managers attempt to improve their management by updating their relative belief in these 
competing models.   Each simulated year managers test Model 1 and Model 2 against the lake’s 
observed behavior.  Because they are limited to two models they believe Model 1 with 
probability    p1and Model 2 with probability    p2, where    p1 + p2 =1.  This type of management 
action corresponds to management that compares existing models of nature rather than creating 
new models.   
The likelihood kernel of a model given a single observation at time t can be calculated as 
<5> 
  
L 1,t = exp −
















L 2,t = exp −















where    Xt,m1is the value of X at time t  predicted by Model 1 at time t    −1, and     Xt,m2  is the same 
for Model 2.  These likelihood kernels can be used to update the posterior probability of each 










p1,t−1L 1,t + p2,t−1L2, t
. 
 
At each time step equations <5> and <6> are recalculated to update the probability that managers 
assign to each model based upon their past observations.   
Management:  
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The management aspect of the model assumes that managers value the lake as a source of 
ecosystem services (e.g. clean water) and as a sink of P pollution <7>.   
<7>     U = Ub +Uc 
We assume that the value of the lake as a pollution sink increases linearly with the amount of P 
loaded into the lake <8>, and that the value of services produced by the lake declines as a 
quadratic function of lake P concentrations <9>. 
<8>     Ub = k1l  
<9>       Uc =−k2 X
2
Therefore, net utility at time t be rewritten as <10>  
<10>  where  Ut = kl t − Xt
2 k = k1 k2  
This utility function is used for illustrative purposes.  The assumption of this simple 
utility function for the management of an ecosystem ignores differences in values between the 
different people who have a stake in the lake.  Rigorous economic analysis would address the 
heterogeneous values of different  stakeholders as well as the difficult problem of producing a 
valid measure of aggregate welfare (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). 
The expected utility of a given P loading rate depends upon the management model is 
used to forecast the lake’s P dynamics.  Consequently the optimal loading is different for each 
management model (Fig. 3). 
 
[Insert Fig. 3. Near Here] 
 
Because the managers have two competing models of lake response, expected utility is 
<11>  .  EU t [] = p1,tEU 1, t [] + p2,tEU 2,t []
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The managers seek to maximize the expected net present value of the lake, which is the 
summation of future expected utilities discounted by the discount rate 1-δ. 





The optimal loading, l*, is the time series of P loadings that maximizes the expected net present 
value of the lake (Appendix A). 
<13>  l
* =
k 1− Bδ ()
2δ
− BXt −b− rp2,t 
Substituting optimal loading <13> into <3> and <4> with    p2=0 and    p2=1, respectively, yields 
the expected optimal equilibrium value of    X  for management model 1 and model 2. 
<14>  X
* =
k 1− Bδ ()
2δ
  
However if <13> is substituted into equation <1> with    p2=0 and    p2=1 there are four 
possible alternate equilibrium values.  Two of these equilibria are the expected optimal value of 
   X for each model <14>, and two are unexpected equilibria values of    X .  The highest 
equilibrium value occurs when the lake recycles P, but the managers do not believe that it does 
(i.e. strong belief in model 1).  The lowest equilibrium value occurs when the lake does not 
recycle P, but managers believe that it probably does (i.e. strong belief in model 2).  These 
unexpected equilibria are given by 
<15>  , and  Xm1,r
* = X
* + r Xm2,nr
* = X
* − r 
Because P recycling occurs if    X > X crit,   can only exist if there is P recycling; that 
is if     .  Similarly,     can only exist if there is no P recycling, 
which is true when   .  Consequently, there are two alternate stable states if 
. 
  Xm1, r
*
2, nr Xm1, r
* > X crit









2, nr    Xm1,
*
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Implementation 
Parameters of the model were chosen so that alternate stable states existed and natural P loading 
was less than    Xcrit (i.e. plausible P loading rates).  Furthermore, for ease of presentation, the 
model was parameterized so that maximum values of X and net utility are less than 1.  At a high 
discount rate (e.g. δ=0.5) the future is not highly valued and managers will sacrifice the future 
state of the lake for the benefits of disposing of P in the present.  Such high discount rates are 
both uninteresting and atypical.  To avoid illustrating the effects of discounting we choose a 
relatively low discount rate.  Parameters chosen for an example model are    =0.02,     b B= 0.1,  
   r=0.2,    Xcrit= 0.7,  σ





The optimal loading chosen by a manager depends upon the degree of belief in each 
management model.  However, because each management model implies a single equilibrium, 
lake managers can be surprised by the switches between alternate equilibria that occur in the 
lake.  When the lake is managed using Model 1, the expected equilibrium does not exist, and the 
system will be attracted towards an equilibrium that is higher than expected (Fig. 4a).  Similarly, 
if the managers believe Model 2, a lower optimal loading will be chosen, producing a stable 
equilibrium, however in this case there is also another lower stable equilibrium (the oligotrophic 
state) to which a shock can  move the ecosystem (Fig. 4b). 
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[Insert Fig. 4 Near Here] 
 
While changes in belief and loading vary smoothly, changes in utility and lake P are 
occasionally abrupt providing both positive and negative surprises.  This movement between one 
equilibrium and another results in an aperiodic cycling in belief in different models, lake P 
concentration, P loading and net utility (Fig. 5). 
 
[Insert Fig. 5 Near Here] 
 
Resilience can be used as an index of the potential for transitions between the 
oligotrophic and eutrophic states.  Resilience can be defined as the amount of change required to 
shift the lake from one state to another (Holling 1973).  Because    Xcritseparates oligotrophic and 
eutrophic states, the distance between the current state of the lake    Xt and   Xcrit can be used as a 
measure of resilience.  Managers are unaware of the resilience of the lake, because they are 
unaware that P recycling occurs when    Xt exceeds    Xcrit.  Examining how shifts in P loading and 
belief in management models alter resilience helps reveals why abrupt transitions between 
oligotrophic and eutrophic states occur. 
Figure 6 shows two different perspectives on the dynamics of the same simulation.  In 
Fig. 6a, as P loading increases, resilience gradually decreases, and then persists at a high utility 
and low resilience, until a shock causes the lake to shift to a eutrophic state.  When the lake shifts 
to a eutrophic state, utility drops rapidly while the resilience of the eutrophic state increases.  In 
response to the shift to a eutrophic state, managers reduce P loading, which gradually decreases 
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the resilience of the eutrophic state until the lake abruptly reverts to an oligotrophic state and the 
cycle begins again. 
The P loading that managers apply to a lake depends upon what probabilities managers 
assign to competing models.  In Fig 6b, changes in belief in Model 2 (that the lake is eutrophic) 
are compared to resilience and how well management forecasts the future dynamics of the lake.  
As belief that the lake is oligotrophic declines, predictions become more accurate, but resilience 
declines.  When the oligotrophic lake becomes eutrophic there is a surprising error in prediction 
and resilience increases.  After several poor predictions, belief in the oligotrophic model declines 
and model predictions become more accurate.  However, as belief in the eutrophic lake further 
increases, prediction becomes less accurate.  This is because there is no stable eutrophic 
management equilibrium.  When the lake switches back to a oligotrophic state its resilience 
increases.  Belief in Model 2 increases temporarily because belief depends upon past 
observations rather than the current state of the lake.  However, once entering the oligotrophic 
state, belief in the eutrophic model (Model 2) declines rapidly. 
 
[Insert Fig. 6 Near Here] 
 
DISCUSSION 
  Our model is a simple, transparent parable about  rational, scientific management  leading 
to cycles of collapse and renewal for a managed ecosystem.  In our model, rational scientific 
management is represented by a passive adaptive management process in which no effort is 
made to enlarge the model space.  Management actions are rational in the sense that data and 
competing models is used to make decisions that maximize expected utility.  Cycles arise from 
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the dynamics  of the beliefs of managers as supported by actual lake behavior.  As the weight of 
evidence builds for a particular management model, policies become fixed and belief in the 
model fossilizes as no contradictory evidence is gathered.  Eventually, a surprise provides new 
evidence that supports the alternative model, increasing uncertainty, and resulting in changes in 
policy.  Evidence accumulates in support of the alternative model, leading to the fixation of a 
different policy, until the system produces another surprise.  Because management actions 
depend upon what managers know at a given time and the models that are available to them, 
even if a system has exhibited cycles in the past, managers will attribute these cycles to some 
low probability events.  Breaking away from these cycles requires creating a new management 
model of the system that adequately captures the dynamics of the system. 
In respect to its information dynamics, our model is related to work in economics that 
explores learning and its limits.  Rational behavior can create chaos in markets (Brock and 
Hommes 1997) and cyclic behavior in economies (Nyarko 1991).  Economists have also 
explored the adaptive management of simpler systems, in which the system being managed 
neither evolves dynamically (Easley and Kiefer 1988), nor exhibits alternative stable states 
(Beck and Wieland, 2002).  Future research could be able to extend our work to examine active 
adaptive ecosystem management. 
Our model is an abstraction of the general situation in which a manager must choose 
input rates to an ecosystem of a substance with unknown persistence, recycling, or 
transformations.  Many ecological processes exhibit time-lagged dynamics, delays in response to 
intervention, or irreversible change.  Examples include carbon dioxide enrichment of the 
atmosphere, persistent organic pollutants, and heavy metal pollution.  Thus, in a general way, we 
expect that our findings about uncertainty, learning, and ecosystem dynamics would arise in 
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more detailed and realistic models for managing inputs of a wide variety of substances to a wide 
variety of ecosystems.  
The route to collapse shown here provides an alternative to other explanations of 
ecological  collapse including inability to detect gradual change (Martin 1973, Alroy 2001), the 
tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), command and control management (Holling and Meffe 
1996), social inequality (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987), or rational overexploitation (Clark 1973).  
The mechanism demonstrated here is one plausible cause of the cycles seen in more complex 
models of ecosystem management (Carpenter et al. 1998b, Janssen and Carpenter 1999, Janssen 
2001).   
The surprises that cause policy shifts in this model are analogous to those seen in many 
case studies of ecosystem management (Gunderson et al. 1995).  For example, cultural 
eutrophication of lakes in North America, initially recognized following World War II, was a 
surprise (Hasler 1947), as was the emergence of dead zones and harmful algal blooms as serious 
environmental problems for coastal oceans (Downing et al. 1999).  In these cases, long periods 
of stasis reinforced the notion that “dilution was the solution to pollution,” however this belief 
was eventually made untenable by surprising and massive changes in receiving waters (Likens 
1992).  Similarly, surprising collapses in Northern cod (Walters and Maguire 1996) and Peruvian 
achoveta fisheries (Pitcher and Hart 1982) have been blamed, at least in part, on inadequate 
models of the fishery.  Additionally, and unexpectedly, cod populations have not recovered 
despite a decade of severely limited fishing (Bundy 2001).  The emergence of the ozone hole 
over Antarctica and of AIDS provide two strikingly different examples of how large-scale social-
ecological systems can behave in surprising ways. 
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  By definition, surprises are infrequent events.  Most of the time, ecosystem behavior 
fluctuates around a repeated pattern - it remains within a regime that becomes familiar to 
scientists and policymakers.  Thus, scientific evidence accumulates in support of models that 
explain ecosystem dynamics within that familiar regime.  Policies ultimately become fixed at an 
apparent optimal point and ecosystem behavior is constrained within a small portion of its actual 
range.  This biased sample of the ecosystem’s potential behaviors increases belief in the 
prevailing model.  The solidification of evidence and policy choices around this apparently best 
model sets the stage for surprise if, and when, ecosystem dynamics shift to a new regime. 
  There are many ways to avoid the rational route to collapse.  They all involve expanding 
the range of models under  consideration.  Opening the decision making process to include a 
more diverse set of stakeholders can increase the set of information and models that can be 
developed and tested during ecosystem management.   More specifically, scientists can 
contribute to broadening the worldview of ecosystem management in at least three ways.  (1) 
Scientists can point out that uncertainty is a property of the set of models under consideration.  
This set of models is a mental construct (even if it depends in part on prior observation of the 
ecosystem).  It therefore depends on attitudes and beliefs that are unrelated to putatively 
objective information about the ecosystem.  Despite this discomforting aspect of  uncertainty, it 
cannot be ignored.  (2) Scientists can help to imagine novel models for how the system might 
change in the future.  There will be cases where such novel models carry non-negligible weight 
in decision, for example when the costs of collapse are high.  The consequences of candidate 
policies can be examined under models with very different implications for ecosystem behavior.  
Such explorations of the robustness of policies can be carried out when model uncertainty is 
quite high or even unknown, for example in scenario analysis (Wack 1985, van der Heijden 
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1996, Peterson et al. In Review).  (3) Scientists can point out the value of safe, informative 
experiments to test models beyond the range of available data.  In the model presented here, 
fossilization of beliefs follows from fixation on policies that do not reveal the full dynamic 
potential of the ecosystem, leading to the underestimation of model uncertainty.  
Experimentation at scales appropriate for testing alternative models for ecosystem behavior is 
one way out the trap.  Of course, large-scale experiments on ecosystems that support human 
well-being must be approached with caution.  Nevertheless, in situations where surprising and 
unfavorable ecosystem dynamics are possible, it may be valuable to experiment with innovative 
practices that could reinforce desirable ecosystem states. 
  The consideration of diverse models in decision making or in adaptive management is 
neither easy nor cost-free.  In future work we plan to assess these issues by examining how 
model diversity and active adaptive management influence the success of simulated ecosystem 
management.  However, the experiences of those who have attempted to apply adaptive 
management suggest that while technical challenges remain nontrivial, the social, economic and 
political complexities of organizing such schemes are far greater barriers to their implementation 
(Walters 1997, Marmorek and Peters, 2001).  Thus the study of effective institutional designs for 




This work was supported by the Resilience Alliance, through a grant from the James S. 
McDonnell Foundation, and the National Science Foundation.  It was improved by comments 
from S. Cox, E. Bennett, J. Clark and two anonymous referees. 




Alroy, J. 2001. A multispecies overkill simulation of the end-Pleistocene megafaunal mass 
extinction. Science 292:1893-1896. 
Beck, G., and V. Wieland. 2002. Learning and control in a changing economic environment. 
Journal of economic dynamics and control 26:1359-1377. 
Bellman, R.  1957.  Dynamic Programming.  Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
USA. 
Bennett, E. M., S. R. Carpenter, and N. F. Caraco. 2001. Human impact on erodable phosphorus 
and eutrophication: A global perspective. Bioscience 51:227-234. 
Berkes, F., and C. Folke, editors. 1998. Linking ecological and social systems. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Blaikie, P., and H. Brookfield. 1987. Land degradation and society. Routledge, New York, NY. 
Brock, W., and C. Hommes. 1997. A rational route to randomness. Econometrica 65:1059-1095. 
Bundy, A. 2001. Fishing on ecosystems: the interplay of fishing and predation in Newfoundland-
Labrador. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 58:1153-1167. 
Carpenter, S. R., D. Bolgrien, R. C. Lathrop, C. A. Stow, T. Reed, and M. A. Wilson. 1998a. 
Ecological and economic analysis of lake eutrophication by nonpoint pollution. Australian 
Journal of Ecology 23:68-79. 
Carpenter, S. R., N. F. Caraco, D. L. Correll, R. W. Howarth, A. N. Sharpley, and V. H. Smith. 
1998b. Nonpoint pollution of surface waters with phosphorus and nitrogen. Ecological 
Applications 8:559-568. 
19 Peterson et al – A rational route to collapse 
Carpenter, S. R., D. Ludwig, and W. A. Brock. 1999. Management of eutrophication for lakes 
subject to potentially irreversible change. Ecological Applications 9:751–771. 
Clark, C. 1973. The economics of over-exploitation. Science 181:630-634. 
Clark, C.W.  1990.  Mathematical Bioeconomics:  The Optimal Management of Renewable 
Resources.  Wiley, NY. 
Clark, J. S., S. R. Carpenter, M. Barber, S. Collins, A. Dobson, J. A. Foley, D. M. Lodge, M. 
Pascual, R. Pielke, W. Pizer, C. Pringle, W. V. Reid, K. A. Rose, O. Sala, W. H. Schlesinger, 
D. H. Wall, and D. Wear. 2001. Ecological forecasts: An emerging imperative. Science 
293:657-660. 
Cooke, G.D., E.B. Welch, S.A. Peterson and P.R. Newroth.  1993.  Restoration and Management 
of Lakes and Reservoirs.  Lewis Publishers, Boca Raton, Florida. 
Deaton, A., and J. Muellbauer. 1980. Economics and consumer behavior. Cambridge University 
Press, London, UK. 
Downing, J. A., J. L. Baker, R. J. Diaz, T. Prato, N. N. Rabalais, and R. J. Zimmerman. 1999. 
Gulf of Mexico hypoxia: land and sea interactions. 134, Council for Agricultural Science and 
Technology, Ames, IA. 
Easley, D., and N. M. Kiefer. 1988. Controlling a stochastic process with unknown parameters. 
Econometrica 56:1045-1064. 
Gunderson, L., C. Holling, and S. Light, editors. 1995. Barriers and bridges to the renewal of  
ecosystems and institutions. Columbia University Press, New York. 
Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243-1247. 
Hasler, A. D. 1947. Eutrophication of lakes by domestic drainage. Ecology 28:383-395. 
20 Peterson et al – A rational route to collapse 
Hilborn, R., and M. Mangel. 1997. The ecological detective: confronting models with data. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Hodell, D. A., M. Brenner, J. H. Curtis, and T. Guilderson. 2001. Solar forcing of drought 
frequency in the Maya lowlands. Science 292:1367-1370. 
Holling, C. S. 1973. Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 4:1-
23. 
Holling, C. S., and G. K. Meffe. 1996. Command and control and the pathology of natural 
resource management. Conservation Biology 10:328-337. 
Janssen, M. A. 2001. An exploratory integrated model to assess management of lake 
eutrophication. Ecological Modelling 140:111-124. 
Janssen, M. A., and S. R. Carpenter. 1999. Managing the resilience of lakes: a multi-agent 
modeling approach. Conservation Ecology 3:15. 
Likens, G. E. 1992. The ecosystem approach : its use and abuse. Oldendorf-Luhe, Germany. 
Mangel, M. and C.W. Clark.  1988.  Dynamic Modeling in Behavioral Ecology.  Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA. 
Marmorek, D., and C. Peters. 2001. Finding a PATH towards scientific collaboration: insights 
from the Columbia River Basin. Conservation Ecology 5(2):8 [online] URL: 
http://www.consecol.org/vol5/iss2/art8. 
Martin, P. S. 1973. The discovery of America. Science 179:969-974. 
Nyarko, Y. 1991. Learning in mis-specified models and the possibility of cycles. Journal of 
Economic Theory 55:416-427. 
Peterson, G. D., G. Cumming, and S. R. Carpenter. In Review. Scenario planning: a tool for 
conservation in an uncertain world. Conservation Biology. 
21 Peterson et al – A rational route to collapse 
Pitcher, T., and P. J. B. Hart. 1982. Fisheries ecology. Chapman and Hall, London, UK. 
Scheffer, M., S. H. Hosper, M.-L. Meijer, B. Moss, and E. Jeppesen. 1993. Alternative equilibria 
in shallow lakes. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 8:275-279. 
Schindler, D. W. 1977. Evolution of phosphorus limitation in lakes. Science 195:260-262. 
Schindler, D. W., R. H. Hesslein, and M. A. Turner. 1987. Exchange of nutrients between 
sediments and water after 15 years of experimental eutrophication. Canadian Journal of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 44:26-33. 
Smith, V. H. 1998. Cultural eutrophication of inland, eustuarine, and coastal waters. Pages 7-49 
in M. L. Pace and P. M. Groffman, editors. Successes, limitations, and frontiers in ecosystem 
science. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY. 
Soranno, P. A., S. R. Carpenter, and R. C. Lathrop. 1997. Internal phosphorus loading in Lake 
Mendota: response to external loads and weather. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Sciences 54:1883-1893. 
van der Heijden, K. 1996. Scenarios: the art of strategic conversation. John Wiley and Sons, New 
York, NY. 
Wack, P. 1985. Scenarios - shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review 63:139-150. 
Walters, C. 1997. Challenges in adaptive management of riparian and coastal ecosystems. 
Conservation Ecology [online] 1:1. Available from the Internet. URL: 
http://www.consecol.org/vol1/iss2/art1. 
Walters, C., and D. Ludwig. 1994. Calculation of Bayes posterior probability-distributions for 
key population parameters. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 51:713-722. 
Walters, C., and J.-J. Maguire. 1996. Lessons for stock assessment from the northern cod 
collapse. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 6:125-137. 
22 Peterson et al – A rational route to collapse 
Walters, C. J. 1986. Adaptive management of renewable resources. McGraw Hill, New York. 
Wieland, V. 2000. Learning by doing and the value of optimal experimentation. Journal of 
economic dynamics and control 24:501-534. 
Wilson, M. A., and S. R. Carpenter. 1999. Economic valuation of freshwater ecosystem services 
in the United States: 1971-1997. Ecological Applications 9:772-783. 
 
23 Peterson et al – A rational route to collapse 
APPENDIX A: 
CALCULATION OF THE OPTIMAL LOADING 
  The optimal loading, l*, is the time series of P loadings that maximizes the net present 
value of expected utility 




where the summation is over infinite time t, δ is the annual discount factor, and Ut is given by 
<10>.  Therefore 
<A.2>     V = δ




The expected discounted present value at time t is given by an expression of the form Vt = k lt – 
Xt
2 + δ Et[Vt+1].  This expression will be defined precisely below, given a feedback policy that 
calculates lt as a function of Xt and the parameters.  This recursion is familiar to behavioral 
ecologists (Bellman 1957, Mangel and Clark 1988). 
  At each time step, we have belief probabilities for the two models, p1,t and p2,t, where 1 = 
p1,t + p2,t.  Given these probabilities, we wish to compute the value functions V1(Xt) and V2(Xt), 
and then compute the loading that maximizes the net expected value weighted by belief 
probabilities for the two models.  This loading maximizes the following expression over lt: 
<A.3>   V1,2 = k lt – Xt
2 + δ [p1,t V1(Xt+1) + (1-p1,t) V2(Xt+1)] 
In this paper, we do not address future dynamics of the belief probabilities.  This represents 
passive adaptive management, in which current beliefs are used to choose policy without 
consideration of possible future changes in beliefs (Walters 1986).  Also, we assume that loading 
can be negative.  In a real lake, negative loading corresponds to an intervention that removes 
phosphorus, such as dredging (Cooke et al. 1993).  The assumption that loading can be negative 
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is consistent with our goal of minimizing the model’s complexity in order to understand the 
implications of passive adaptive management.  A calculation of optimal loading for a similar 
model in which loading must be non-negative is presented by Carpenter et al. (1999). 
  We will compute the optimal policy over the set of policies that jump to a fixed level y in 
one time step.  In the deterministic case, the optimal policy will jump to the optimal level of X in 
one step (Clark 1990).   Our case is stochastic.  For a nonlinear stochastic lake model with two 
stable states, the policy computed by this method is close to optimal (Carpenter et al. 1999) and 
we assume that the method is adequate for the purposes of this paper. 
In this paragraph, we show that y*, the optimal level of X, is the same under both models.  
The goal is to find y* that will maximize V(Xt | model i).  Under a given model i, we then 
compute the value of ls that will cause Es[Xs+1 | model i] to jump to y* in one step.  We will 
derive y* under model 1 (where the unknown parameter is b), and then show that y* is the same 
under model 2 (where the unknown parameter is b+r).  We begin with the value function, which 
satisfies the recursion 
<A.4>   V(Xs) = V(y + Ss+1) = k ls – Xs
2 + δ Es[V(y + Ss+1)] 
What is ls given y?  In the next few steps, we will calculate the value of ls that gets Es[Xs+1] to y 
in one step, and then compute Es[V(y + Ss+1)], and then choose y* to maximize V(y + Ss).   From 
<3> 
<A.5>   Xs+1 = B Xs + ls + b + Ss 
Recall that Ss is drawn after ls is chosen. Take expectations of both sides of <A.5> to calculate ls 
<A.6.>   ls = y – B Xs – b 
Define 
<A.7>   W(y) ≡ Es[V(y + Ss+1)] 
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Because Ss are identically and independently distributed (IID), W(y) depends only on y.  
Because y is a constant target and Ss is IID, 
<A.8>   Es-1[V(Xs)] = Es-1[V(y + Ss-1)] = W(y) 
We use <A.8> to take Es-1 of both sides of <A.4>, and (using the fact that S is IID) obtain 
<A.9>   W(y) = Es-1[k ls – Xs
2] + δ W(y) 
By definition Es-1[Ss-1] = 0 and Es-1[Ss-1
2] = σ
2.  Consequently 
<A.10>  Es-1[k ls – Xs
2] = Es-1[k(y – B(y + Ss-1) – b ) – (y + Ss-1)
2 )] 
<A.11>  Es-1[k ls – Xs
2] = k(y – B y – b) – (y
2 + σ
2) 
Using <A.11> we get from <A.9> 
<A.12>    W(y) = k(y – B y – b) – (y
2 + σ
2) + δ W(y) 
<A.13>    W(y) = [1 / (1 - δ)] [ k(y – B y – b) – (y
2 + σ
2)  ] 
Now the optimal y is found by choosing y* to maximize 
<A.14>  V(Xs) = V(y + Ss) = k ls – Xs
2 + [δ / (1 - δ)] [ k(y – B y – b) – (y
2 + σ
2)  ] 
with lt = y – B Xt – b.   Differentiate <A.14> with respect to y and solve for y* to find 
<A.15>    y* = k (1 – B δ) / 2 δ 
Note that we get exactly the same expression for y* if we replace b with b+r in the preceding 
argument.  Therefore the choice of the optimal target y* is the same under both models.  Of 
course, the optimal load l* is different under the two models, because under model 1 l*t = y* – B 
Xt – b and under model 2 l*t = y* – B Xt – (b + r).  W(y) also depends on the choice of model 
(because under model 2, b in <A.13> is replaced by b+r). 
  Now we use the insights obtained above to compute the optimal load l* in the case where 
we have nonzero belief probabilities about the two models.  Under the first model  
<A.16>  V1(Xt) = k(y* - B Xt – b) + δ W1(y*) 
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where W1 denotes W calculated under model 1 (i.e. with r=0).  Under the second model 
<A.17>  V2(Xt) = k[y* - B Xt – (b + r)] + δ W2(y*) 
Equations <A.16> and <A.17> are used in <A.3> to find the expression that will be maximized 
to find lt.  The value function is iterated one time step to find the terms that involve Xt+1 and are 
impacted by lt.  Each value from time t+2 onward is computed by assuming that each successive 
ls is chosen to move Es[Xs+1] to y*, and y* is the same under both models.  Therefore, none of 
these terms at t+2 and beyond depends on lt.  When we take the expectations of terms involving 
Xt+1, discard terms that do not involve lt, differentiate with respect to lt, and solve for lt we find 
<A.18>  l*t = y* - [B Xt + b + r p2,t] 
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Fig 1.  Schematic diagram of the lake ecosystem management model. 
 
Fig 2.  An illustration of the P dynamics model.  In example A) low P loading results in a single 
stable oligotrophic equilibrium.  In B) at a higher P loading the same lake has two stable 
equilibrium values – one oligotrophic (the lower point) and one eutrophic (the higher point). 
 
Fig 3.  Expected utility of different amounts of loading for the oligotrophic and eutrophic  
management models. 
 
Fig 4.  Expected and actual P equilibria values when A) lake is managed as if model 1 is true, 
and B) as if model 2 is true. 
 
Fig 5.  A single realization of the model time dynamics.  A) P loading to the lake varies 
gradually while levels of P within the vary more dramatically.  B) Changes in belief in the 
competing management models varies cyclically over time.  C) Changes in utility produced by 
the lake vary abruptly, while expected utility varies slowly. 
 
Fig. 6.  An example of the dynamics of the model. A) High P loading increases the utility of the 
lake, but decreases lake resilience, until the lake flips to a eutrophic state.  Utility of the lake 
rapidly declines.  As the loading of the eutrophic lake decreases, the resilience of that state 
gradually decreases, while utility remains low.  Eventually the lake once more becomes 
oligotrophic and the cycle begins again.  B) Belief in a model increases as prediction error 
(surprise) declines.  However, as certainty increases, the lake management causes lake resilience 
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to decrease, increasing the chance that a lake while change state, producing a management 
surprise.  When such a surprise occurs, the degree of belief in a model rapidly declines, causing 
belief in the other model to increase. 
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